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Hamdan Confronts the Military Commissions
Act of 2006
GEORGE P. FLETCHER*
In 2006 the law of war experienced two major shock
waves. The first was the decision of the Supreme
Court in Hamdan, which represented the first major
defeat of the President's plan, based on an executive
order of November 2001, to use military tribunals
against suspected international terrorists. The major-
ity of the Court held the procedures used in the mili-
tary tribunal against Hamdan violated common article
three of the Geneva Conventions. A plurality offour,
with the opinion written by Justice Stevens, based
their decision as well on afar-reaching interpretation
of the substantive law of war. They held that conspir-
acy to commit terrorist acts did not fall under the cus-
tomary international law of war. Congress responded
by enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
The President signed the bill on October 17. The in-
terpretation of Hamdan and the precedents on which it
is based will shape future litigation about the constitu-
tionality of the various provisions of this legislation.
1. COMMON ARTICLE THREE ...................................................... 430
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ................................................ 433
III. Is CONSPIRACY AN OFFENSE UNDER THE LAW OF WAR? ....... 440
A. The Comparative Critique ............................................. 444
B. The International Critique .............................................. 448
C. The H istorical Critique .................................................. 449
IV THE RISE AND FALL OF FOUR PRECEDENTS ............................ 455
A . M illigan .......................................................................... 4 55
B . Q uirin ............................................................................. 4 59
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School. M.C.L., J.D.,
University of Chicago; B.A. University of California, Berkeley. Member of the Supreme
Court Bar. Portions of this essay are based on arguments I made in a brief as amicus curiae
for experts in conspiracy and the law of war in Hamdan.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W
C . Yam ashita ....................................................................... 463
D . E isentrager ..................................................................... 464
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF CONSPIRACY ......................... 464
There is much praise in liberal circles for the Supreme
Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.1 This is the first time a ma-
jority of the Court has stood up and said "no" to the president's post-
9/11 actions taken in the name of national security. The Hamdan
dispute began on November 13, 2001, when the president followed
the wartime precedent of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and decreed
military tribunals to prosecute "international terrorists" under the su-
pervision of the Oval Office. 2 The war in Afghanistan was already
underway and there followed a series of arrests and detentions in
Guantdinamo Bay. One of these detainees was Salim Ahmed Ham-
dan, who had been Osama bin Laden's personal driver for five years;
he was arrested after 9/11. His case was one of the many prosecu-
tions that began in the summer of 2003 when the Department of De-
fense decided to invoke the President's executive order and charge
Hamdan in a military tribunal with having joined a conspiracy to en-
gage in terrorist actions against civilian targets.
One of the procedural peculiarities of the newly-created
commission is a rule that requires, at the judges' discretion, the de-
fendant to leave the room when the government's witnesses testify
against him.3 The government understandably wants to protect the
identity of its sources. But there is an obvious problem in requiring
the defendant's lawyer to carry on a defense without his client by his
side to inform him about the merit of the testimony offered against
him. This is precisely why the Sixth Amendment vests in every de-
fendant the right to confront the witnesses against him.
The threatened application of this procedural rule in Ham-
dan's case provoked litigation in federal court to enjoin the proceed-
ings. When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, a new is-
sue came into focus-namely, whether the military tribunal had
jurisdiction, under the law of war, over the charge of conspiracy to
kill civilians. A plurality of four votes-Justices Stevens, Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter-held that the stand-alone offense of conspir-
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
3. Military Commission Order No. 1 § 6B(3) (Mar. 21, 2002); see also id. § 6D(5)
(discussing the judge's ability to exercise his or her discretion to review evidence outside the
presence of the defendant).
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acy was not part of the law of war and therefore the tribunal lacked
jurisdiction to try Hamdan. In addition they held-together with a
fifth vote, Justice Kennedy-that the procedure of requiring the de-
fendant to leave the room violated his rights under Common Article
Three of the Geneva Conventions, which was applicable in the tribu-
nals under the law of war. Justice Breyer wrote a brief opinion,
signed by three others in the majority but not by Justice Stevens,
suggesting that Congress could enact legislation upholding the use of
military tribunals. Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito dissented on
various grounds, including opposition on the issue of conspiracy.
4
Justice Roberts did not participate because he had voted against
Hamdan in the D.C. Court of Appeals.
Congress responded to Hamdan by enacting the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, signed by the President on October 17,
2006 ("MCA 2006"). The new statute seems to have superceded the
executive orders-called the Military Commission Instruction Num-
ber 2 (MCI2)-that were in place starting in 2003.6 In this essay I
will continue to refer to the provisions of MCI2, though the new stat-
ute presumably takes precedence.
The MCA 2006 is the first direct and explicit legislative au-
thorization of the use of military tribunals. It authorizes trials for one
category of enemy combatants in military tribunals and for another
category in courts martial. 7 Since the executive and the legislative
branches are in almost perfect alignment on these issues, supporters
are likely to cite Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube and assume the constitutionality of the statute.
8
But legitimate doubts remain about numerous provisions in
the new statute. These include questions about authorization under
Article I, the capacity of Congress to enact a definitive interpretation
to international treaties, 9 court martial jurisdiction, 10 military com-
4. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2823 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2849 (Alito, J., dissenting).
5. The provisions regulating military commissions are technically part of § 3(a)(1) of
MCA 2006, which adds Chapter 47A to Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The citations to these
new provisions are to the section numbers of the new Chapter 47A. In all other cases the
citation refers to the relevant section of the MCA 2006.
6. Military Commission Instruction No. 2 (Apr. 30, 2003).
7. MCA 2006, supra note 5, § 948(c), § 948(d)(b).
8. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum .... ").
9. MCA 2006, supra note 5, § 948(b)(f) (asserting that the statute de facto satisfies
the requirements of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
10. Id. § 948(d)(b) (asserting indirectly that courts martial shall have jurisdiction over
'lawful enemy combatants' who violate one of the substantive provisions of the statute).
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mission jurisdiction, I I and attempts to restrict federal court jurisdic-
tion both over appeals from military commissions and habeas cor-
pus. 12
In order to understand the issues at play, we must engage in a
systematic review of the Hamdan decision, the congressional reac-
tion to Hamdan, and the four principal cases decided by the Supreme
Court between 1866 and 1950 which animate Hamdan: Milligan,
13
Quirin,14 Yamashita,15 and Eisentrager.16 The question at the fore-
front of our attention will be the possible challenges to the validity of
the diverse provisions of the MCA 2006. To construct these possible
challenges we shall attend in Part One to the implications of the Ge-
neva Conventions, in Part Two to the relevance of the Constitution,
in Part Three to the arguments raised against the charge of conspiracy
in the Hamdan deliberations, and, in Part Four, to the future potential
of the four leading precedents of the Supreme Court. Finally, I ana-
lyze the approach to the charge of conspiracy in the MCA 2006.
I. COMMON ARTICLE THREE
Human rights activists have applauded Hamdan because five
Justices recognized the controlling force of Common Article Three of
the Geneva Conventions. 17 This article is called "common" because
it appears in all four of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949.
The obligations imposed by this common article are often regarded as
peremptory principles of international law, binding on all national
and sub-national groups1 8 whether they are parties to the Geneva
11. Id. § 948(d)(a) (asserting jurisdiction over 'alien unlawful enemy combatants' who
at any time in the past violated one of the substantive provisions of the statute).
12. In Section 7, MCA 2006 amends 28 U.S.C. § 2441 to deny habeas jurisdictions to
any judge hearing a petition from an alien detained by the United States as an enemy
combatant.
13. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
14. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
15. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
16. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
17. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Common Article Three].
18. This language is admittedly vague, but there is nothing more precise in the relevant
treaties to identify which actors may be held liable for breaching the Geneva Conventions.
The Rome Statute punishes all violations of Common Article Three that are committed by
organized groups engaged in internal armed conflicts more serious than "internal
[45:427
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Conventions or not. 19 One of these obligations bans "sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 20 In
Hamdan, the Court held that the procedural rule at stake violated
Common Article Three.
2 1
In MCA 2006 Congress seeks to avoid further rulings on the
scope of Common Article Three by legislating a purportedly defini-
tive interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. In its view, the mili-
tary commission is ipsofacto a "regularly constituted court, affording
all the necessary 'judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples for purposes of Common Article Three of the Ge-
neva Convention." 22 Congress also asserts that "no alien unlawful
enemy combatant" may "invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source
of rights." 23 These provisions are rather crude efforts to usurp the
power of the judiciary to interpret binding international agreements.
If Congress could rule on the definitive meaning of treaties, judicial
review would disappear; the word of Congress would become the su-
preme law of the land.
24
The Court could have resolved Hamdan by holding the Con-
stitution applicable to tribunals sitting in Guantdtnamo Bay. Requir-
ing the defendant to leave the courtroom during trial violates the
Sixth Amendment. Yet neither Justice Stevens's opinion for the
Court nor Justice Kennedy's concurrence invokes the Constitutional
system of rights in criminal trials.25 Neither of their opinions even
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts
of a similar nature." Rome Statute of International Criminal Court art. 8.2(d), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
19. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162-63 (D.D.C. 2004). The Rome
Statute has taken Common Article Three and converted it, almost word for word, into a
criminal statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 8.2(c) (punishing all "serious
violations" of provisions identical to Common Article Three).
20. This is the original language of the Geneva Conventions. The reference to
"civilized nations" is now regarded as politically incorrect and therefore has been changed to
"judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable." See Rome Statute,
supra note 18, art. 8.2(c)(iv). Congress has used the outdated language. See MCA 2006,
supra note 5, § 948b(f).
21. Violating these "judicial guarantees" is one of the four prohibitions imposed by
Common Article Three. The other three are: "(a) Violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) Taking of hostages; (c)
Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment."
Common Article Three, supra note 17.
22. MCA 2006, supra note 5, § 948b(f).
23. Id. § 948b(g). This provision was upheld in the first decision in the second round
of the Hamdan litigation. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 89933 (D.D.C.
2006).
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
25. The closest they come is a footnote reference to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
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mentions the Sixth Amendment or the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, principles that would have provided a clear foundation
for rejecting the procedure invoked against Hamdan.
26
The interesting question is why the Court should fear apply-
ing the Constitution to the procedures used in military tribunals. The
Court had no doubts about this in early cases decided during the Civil
War27 and World War 11.28 My supposition is that the Court did not
want to revisit the issue it found so troubling in the Rasul case de-
cided in 2004,29 namely whether the foreign detainees in
Guantdnamo Bay had a constitutional right to habeas corpus. With
Justice Stevens then writing for the Rasul majority, the Court pre-
ferred to protect the rights of the petitioners by extending the habeas
statute to the detainees-thus leaving in doubt whether the Constitu-
tion applies in Guantdnamo Bay. Similarly, in Hamdan, Justice Ste-
vens and the majority preferred to invoke a principle of international
law rather than apply the Sixth Amendment to protect the trial rights
of foreign detainees.
This is what I consider the dark side of Hamdan-using in-
ternational law to avoid confronting the hard question of when and
where Constitutional principles of due process apply abroad. Yet this
escape mechanism raises its own problems. First, it is not clear why
Common Article Three should apply to Hamdan's trial. The relevant
prohibition-against the use of courts not "regularly constituted" and
procedures below the threshold of generally recognized as "indispen-
sable" 3 0-applies only to proceedings growing out of non-
international armed conflicts. The conflict with al Qaeda is interna-
tional in one sense, and not in another. It is not an internal dispute,
and Common Article Three is typically associated with civil war and
internal disputes. 32 Nonetheless we can accept the Court's formalis-
tic argument that an "international" conflict is one between states,
36 (2004) (confrontation clause applies to the states as a principle of due process). This
appears as note 67 in Section 6(D)(iv) of the Stevens opinion, a small segment mostly about
international law to which Justice Kennedy did not adhere. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.
Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
26. See id.
27. SeeExparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
28. SeeExparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
29. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (statutory habeas corpus held applicable to
foreign inmates in the Guantnamo Bay prison).
30. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 8(2)(c)(iv). The original phrase used was
"judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." See supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
31. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2.
32. Thus the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), Prosecutor v. Tadik, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals (Jan.
26, 2000).
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and the dispute with al Qaeda and other international terrorist gangs
is not between the United States and foreign states.33 In this convo-
luted sense the dispute is not international.
But Common Article Three is of highly uncertain content.
There is little law on the question of what constitutes a regularly con-
stituted tribunal or the specification of judicial guarantees that "are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." The MCA 2006
stipulates that military commissions are regularly constituted tribu-
nals and the legislated procedures meet the demands of "civilized
peoples."
35
There is room to dispute both whether military tribunals are
regularly constituted courts3 6 and whether they fall below the con-
temporary understanding of procedures "generally accepted" as "in-
dispensable." After all, what are these generally accepted judicial
guarantees? Jury trial is not one of them. The right to counsel
probably is. Some version of the privilege against self-incrimination
is probably also necessary. The specific issue of concern in Ham-
dan-whether the defendant has the right to be present at all times
during his trial-is probably secured by the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights.37 Although the notion of minimal judicial
guarantees is as vague as the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, we can cobble together basic rights recog-
nized by international agreements as a guide to interpretation.
In the end the Supreme balked when it came to apply the
Constitution to the Guantanamo Bay detainees but they did the more
adventurous thing of recognizing the international law government
the rights of the detainees.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The opinions by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Breyer for
segments of the majority in Hamdan are all preoccupied with the is-
sue of congressional authorization of the military tribunals. But it is
not clear how the question of authorization even arises. If the Consti-
33. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-96 (2006).
34. This interpretation was necessary to avoid an illogical gap in the coverage of the
statute. A conflict with al Qaeda on U.S. soil would clearly be covered by Common Article
Three. If al Qaeda's organization seeped into Mexico, it would no longer be an internal
dispute and, according to the alternative view, Common Article Three would no longer
apply.
35. MCA 2006, supra note 5, § 948b(f).
36. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2849-55 (Alito, J., dissenting).
37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), Dec. 16, 1966, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
2007]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
tution does not apply abroad, then why should the Court be con-
cerned with the issue of authorization? If the United States military
can act outside the Constitution in foreign territories under their con-
trol, then why do their actions need to be justified under Article I?
To put the matter differently, how can the Court recognize Article I's
restraining federal legislative power but not Article III's right to a
jury in the "trial of all crimes"? Further, if congressional authoriza-
tion is an issue, then why do the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment and procedural rights guaranteed in the Sixth Amend-
ment not limit the use of federal power?
The Constitution explicitly requires a jury trial in criminal
cases. Article III establishes the right and the Sixth Amendment re-
peats it just in case we forget. We can only be puzzled by the Su-
preme Court's ignoring these issues in Hamdan, even though it as-
sumes beyond question that Article I governs whether the tribunals
have authority to pass judgment over the defendant Hamdan.
The constitutional inquiry invariably looks to history, but the
exact origins of these tribunals or commissions (the terms are used
interchangeably) remain open to dispute. According to one theory,
they originated during the American Revolution, prior to the enact-
ment of the Constitution. The military trial of Benedict Arnold col-
laborator John Andr6 was the landmark of the time.38 According to
an alternative recitation of the history, military tribunals originated
during the Mexican War in 1847, when General Winfield Scott de-
cided that he needed a tribunal in the field to cope with local resis-
tance to the war effort.39
The earlier date is critical to the constitutional argument about
the right to a jury trial. After all, if the proceedings are criminal in
nature, it is not easy to explain why the right to a jury trial does not
apply. This was a troubling issue both in Milligan40 in 1866 and in
Quirin4' in 1942. The majority in Hamdan had literally no interest in
revisiting these issues.42 As a result, Justice Stevens appears to be
indifferent to the historical dispute. He is willing to accept the 1847
38. For a brief summary of the trial of John Andre, see Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31
n.9 (1942).
39. The leading authority on this history is WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 832-33 (2d ed. 1920).
40. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 73-75 (1866).
41. 317U.S.at39-41.
42. The Stevens opinion does not mention any provision in the Bill of Rights, though
the confrontation clause, due process, and jury trial issues are all relevant. The closest the
five Justices come to mentioning the civil liberties jurisprudence of the Court is a footnote
reference to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
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date,43 presumably without realizing that he is thereby undermining
the argument accepted in Quirin that the tribunals had been "grand-
fathered" into the Constitution.
44
Whenever and wherever they may have originated, the tribu-
nals functioned until 1916 as institutions of military common law-
without mention in the federal statutes. They functioned directly un-
der the supervision of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the
President. In Article 15 of the Articles of War, enacted in the middle
of World War I and now codified as 10 U.S.C. § 821 as the Uniform
Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 4 5 we find at least a covert refer-
ence to the existence of the tribunals. The language has been often
repeated:
The provisions of this code conferring jurisdiction
upon courts-martial shall not be construed as depriv-
ing military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect
of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law
of war may be tried by such military commissions,
provost courts, or other military tribunals.
46
For all its complexity, this provision tells us very little. Another pro-
vision does vest jurisdiction over offenses against the law of war in
courts martial,47 but this provision merely informs us that potential
jurisdiction in a court martial over a violation of the law of war will
not prevent a military tribunal from operation.48 This could be read
simply as an anti-preemption provision, but the importance of this
1916 provision lies elsewhere. As interpreted in the major cases,
49
18 U.S.C. § 821 acknowledges and therefore provides indirect legis-
lative authorization of military tribunals.
It is not clear what the original point of § 821 was. If Con-
gress had wanted to authorize military tribunals in 1916, they would
have said so directly. What then, is the value of recognizing concur-
rent jurisdiction in the military tribunals as a matter of customary
law? In practice, to be sure, there have been few efforts to use mili-
43. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006).
44. 317 U.S. at 41-42.
45. MCA 2006 does entirely supersede 10 U.S.C. § 821. See MCA 2006, supra note 5,
Section 4(a)(2).
46. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (Art. 21), 64 Stat. 115.
47. 10 U.S.C § 818.
48. Although there is no legislation or case law on point, I presume that
commencement of proceedings in federal court would preclude a simultaneous trial in a
military commission.
49. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1946); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799-809 (2006).
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tary commissions to duplicate the prosecutions of courts martial. The
practical purpose of the provision, therefore, is dubious. Its primary
impact has been to provide indirect authorization of the tribunals.
50
Yet § 821 also elicits a confused understanding of the tribu-
nals and where they fit in the scheme of government. According to
one view, the tribunals are a slightly watered-down version of courts
martial that the military can use to try enemy civilians or soldiers for
unspecified crimes against the law of war. 51 Thus the tribunals exist
side-by-side with the courts martial and the justice meted out to the
enemy should be as close as possible to the treatment of our own sol-
diers in courts martial. Commissions are courts-martial-lite, the pre-
sumption being that the enemy deserves no better. 52 This view is ex-
pressed clearly in the oft-litigated § 836 of the same Title 10:
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including
modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter
triable in courts-martial, military commissions and
other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of
inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regula-
tions which shall, so far as he considers practicable,
apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in
the United States district courts, but which may not be
contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article
shall be uniform insofar as practicable.
Note the dual practicability requirement. First, the procedures for the
commissions and the courts martial may deviate only so far as the
President considers "practicable" from the rules of evidence used in
federal court. And second, in a provision adopted after World War
II, "practicable" uniformity between the types of courts must prevail.
These provisions support the view that the commission is a version of
the court martial, the basic difference being that the better court is in-
tended for our own troops, the lesser court is suitable for prosecuting
our enemies.
According to the competing view of the role and place of
50. Some scholars are convinced that § 821 really has authorized the tribunals. See
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2129-33 (2005).
51. A version of this view is expressed in MCA 2006, supra note 5, §§ 948d(a) & (b),
which seeks to apply courts martial to lawful enemy combatants and military tribunals to
unlawful enemy combatants. See id. §§ 948d(a) & (b).
52. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
17, art.103.
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military tribunals, these executive courts derive directly from the law
of war. This view is supported by the language of § 821, namely the
vesting of jurisdiction over "offenses that ... by the law of war may
be tried by such military commissions." The derivation from interna-
tional law is further implied by the customary practices of the tribu-
nals. First, they functioned as a matter of customary law, without
explicit legislative definition, for at least a century. Further, the con-
stitutional warrant for the tribunals is at best derivative of the other
explicit powers related to declaring and fighting wars.53 Finally, the
Supreme Court itself in Quirin drew a convincing analogy between
the punishment of spies and the punishment of those who violate the
law of war. After explaining the permissibility of punishing unlawful
combatants in military tribunals, Chief Justice Stone interrelated the
two types of suspects:
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the
military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking
to gather military information and communicate it to
the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uni-
form comes secretly through the lines for the purpose
of waging war by destruction of life or property, are
familiar examples of belligerents who are generally
deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject
to trial and punishment by military tribunals.
54
The interdependency could not be clearer. The unlawful
combatant as well as the spy are "subject to trial and punishment in
military tribunals." 55 Focusing on this analogy evokes a different
conception of the tribunals, one holding that they are a necessary fea-
ture of the law of war.
At the time the Lieber code was adopted in 1863, it was ac-
ceptable to say simply that spies will "suffer death." 56 The Hague
Conventions sought to ameliorate the status of those engaged in es-
pionage. The Hague text does not penalize spying-rather it limits
the range of the concept 57 and explicitly requires a trial before pun-
53. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11 ("declare War"), 12 ("raise and support




56. See Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln art. 83, Apr. 24, 1863,
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3, 13 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th rev.
ed. 2004).
57. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
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ishment.58 So far as the analogy with the treatment of spies holds,
one could argue that international law itself requires military com-
missions--or at least some form of trial-prior to punishing those
who violate the law of war.
However the commissions or tribunals come into existence,
they are governed by a form of customary law known as the law of
war There is confusion, perhaps deliberate, whether the body [of law
defining crimes cognizable in military courts] is equivalent to the set
of "offenses against the law of nations" that Congress may define
pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 10. 59 The problem with this
view lies, textually, in the structure of Article I, Section 8. In Clause
9, the Constitution enables Congress to create "tribunals inferior to
the Supreme Court." Clause 10-labeled "Offenses"--apparently
grants Congress the power to define certain of the offenses subject to
prosecution in the inferior tribunals, if so created. Thus the implica-
tion is that "offenses against the law of nations" should be tried in the
lower federal courts. There is no explicit constitutional warrant for
relegating the prosecution of these offenses, or indeed any offenses,
to military tribunals.
The words of Article I, Section 8 carry a message less than
favorable to the prosecution of customary offenses in military tribu-
nals. Congress does not have the power to define international law--
only the offenses against international law cognizable in the United
States. Indeed there would be something conceptually illogical and
deeply troubling about Congress's attempt to repeal or alter interna-
tional law by enacting a statute. This suggests that the offenses exist
independently of legislation but that Congress must, or least should,
define these offenses precisely for the sake of the principle nulla
poena sine lege-that is, the prohibition of punishment without the
prior statutory definition of offenses. This concern is confirmed by
the prohibition of ex post facto laws, enacted either by Congress or
the states. 60 As early as 1812, the Court prohibited the prosecution
of non-codified common law offenses in the federal courts. 61 All of
this should remind us how peculiar it is for the Supreme Court to af-
firm the punishment of those who violate the common law of war.
The peculiarity is compounded by institutionalizing proceedings in a
form of court not mentioned in the Constitution.
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art.29, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
58. See id. art. 30 ("A spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous
trial.").
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
61. U.S. v. Hudson, 11 (7 Cranch) U.S. 32, 32 (1812).
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The MCA 2006 purports to define twenty-eight offenses sub-
ject to prosecution in military tribunals. 62 Not all of these are "of-
fenses against the law of nations."
63
The least one can say is that the Court thinks differently about
regular crimes and crimes against the law of war. When it comes to
criminal prosecutions in the United States, the Court reasons rigor-
ously in the following stages: (1) if the sanction is punitive, the pro-
ceedings are criminal in nature,64 and (2) if the proceedings are
criminal in nature, Article III and the Sixth Amendment require a
jury trial.65
If the prosecutions fall outside this constitutional core-if
they are abroad, if they are against those aliens called "enemy com-
batants"-the Court thinks differently. The Constitution is not so
readily applied outside the United States-even when the federal
government asserts its power. It has never been clear to me why the
government should be free of constitutional restraints abroad.66 The
subject remains under-theorized in the case law and in the literature.
Today the restraints on the prosecution of foreigners abroad seem to
derive not from the explicit provisions in the Constitution, but as
formulated by Hamdan, from Common Article Three of the Geneva
Conventions and the international law of war. At least this is now the
dominant mode of thought.
One could easily be afraid of an "anything goes" mentality:
anything the President thinks is necessary to prosecute the war should
be allowed. Some judges and justices-notably, Justice Thomas-
hold this view.67 The extraordinary result of Hamdan is not that the
Court applied Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions in
lieu of the Sixth Amendment, but rather that the vague concept "law
of war" turned out to have teeth-teeth sharp enough to invalidate
the charge of conspiracy laid against Hamdan. The difficult question
posed in the MCA 2006 is whether its provision on conspiracy of-
fends the holding in Hamdan or not. In order to reach that issue we
need to review the arguments in Hamdan about why conspiracy
62. MCA 2006, supra note 5, § 950v(b), 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b) (2006).
63. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(20) (intentionally mistreating a dead body); 10
U.S.C. § 950v(b)(22) (sexual assault or abuse). Nothing in the statute requires that these
offenses be committed in time of war.
64. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1963) (deprivation of
citizenship as form of punishment).
65. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968).
66. My thinking was shaped by my role as an expert witness in the case of U.S. v.
Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S.C. Berlin 1979), where the Court held that the Constitution
applied to the trial of a foreigner in the occupied city of Berlin.
67. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2823 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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should not be considered part of the law of war applicable in military
tribunals.
III. Is CONSPIRACY AN OFFENSE UNDER THE LAW OF WAR?
The point is easily forgotten-Hamdan is neither about the
legitimacy of military commissions nor about the propriety of charg-
ing conspiracy against suspected terrorists. It is about the combina-
tion of these two elements: the procedural form and the substantive
charge. The question in Hamdan was whether that combination vio-
lates the law of war and therefore falls afoul of the authorization of
the tribunals to prosecute offenses under the law of war.
Given the myriad of issues in Hamdan-the procedural ir-
regularities of the tribunals, the attempt by Congress to strip jurisdic-
tion from the Supreme Court while the case was pending, and the is-
sue of abstention and interlocutory appeal-one can only be
impressed that Justice Stevens and the plurality reached the substan-
tive core of the problem. The four vote plurality could easily have
abandoned their interest in the law of war and joined Justice Kennedy
in his argument based exclusively on the violation of Common Arti-
cle Three of the Geneva Convention. This would have been the
"Warrenesque" move, the compromise for the sake of unity.68 But,
instead, Justice Stevens and his three colleagues (Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter) held out in Section Five of the opinion for a
deep and lasting analysis of the law of war. In my opinion, this will
be the contribution of the case over time. For the first time in history,
the Court has delved deeply into this concept that has challenged our
understanding for over two hundred years.
Justice Stevens sets up his analysis of the law of war artfully
by distinguishing among three types of military commissions. One
kind is used in place of the civil courts under conditions of martial
law.69 A second type is used under conditions of occupation. For
example, in the occupation of Germany, a military commission heard
and judged the case of an American wife of a serviceman who killed
her husband on the base. 70 The peculiarity of this type of court is
that it applies the local law of the occupied state. The military tribu-
nal on the American base in Germany applied the German law of
68. The metaphor is based on Chief Justice Warren's success in having negotiated a
unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
69. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866).
70. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 342 (1952).
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homicide rather than the law of war.7 1 The third type of tribunal, as
used in the leading cases from Milligan to Hamdan, is called the law-
of-war tribunal because the jurisdiction derives from the law of war
and the governing substantive law is also the law of war.72 This is a
very helpful conceptualization that will guide future thought on these
matters.
In Hamdan the controversy was whether charges of conspir-
acy are compatible with the law of war as we understand it. This is
the point on which Justice Stevens differs most sharply from Justice
Thomas and his co-dissenters (Justices Scalia and Alito).73 In order
to understand the position of the plurality, implicitly shared or at least
not opposed by Justice Kennedy, we need to immerse ourselves in
the arguments.
Preliminarily, the concept of conspiracy requires clarification.
The same word is used in three different senses:
(1) Agreement as a crime. This is the definition of the
stand-alone offense found in the federal statutes 74 and
in MC12 75 defining the offenses subject to prosecution
in the post-9/11 military commissions: "The accused
entered into an agreement with one or more persons to
commit one or more substantive offenses triable by
military commission or otherwise joined an enterprise
of persons who shared a common criminal purpose
,,76
(2) Collective commission of an offense. This is the
sense in which the phrase "collective plan or conspir-
acy" was used in the Nuremberg trials to refer, retro-
spectively, to the collective planning, preparing, initi-
ating, and waging of aggressive war. The conspiracy
charge was redundant and irrelevant because the very
acts of planning, preparing, initiating, or waging war
require group participation.
(3) Conspiracy as a criterion of complicity. The idea
is that co-conspirators are liable as accessories or aid-
ers-and-abettors of all substantive offenses committed
71. Cf U.S. v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S.C. Berlin 1979) (in which the United States
Court for Berlin, acting under its constitutional authority, applied the German law of
substantive offenses).
72. After the application of Common Article Three in Hamdan, we can say that the
procedural law is also governed by the law of war, as expressed in the Geneva Conventions.
73. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2830 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
75. Military Commission Instruction Number 2, supra note 6, § 6(C)6(a)(1).
76. Id.
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in the course of the conspiracy. This sense is ex-
pressed in the Pinkerton rule in the federal courts77
and was also used in MCI2 defining liability in the
military tribunals.
78
To argue that the charge of conspiracy in Hamdan did not
constitute a crime under the law of war, it was essential to bracket off
two extraneous senses of "conspiracy"-namely conspiracy as col-
lective commission of the offense (number 2 above) and conspiracy
as a criterion of complicity (number 3 above). 79 Nuremberg as a
precedent represents a judgment about conspiracy in the second
sense-as a charge of conspiracy of engaging in aggressive warfare.
There is little harm of using the concept retrospectively in this con-
text. It is confusing to use conspiracy in the third sense, as in MCI2
and the Pinkerton rule, but no claims were made that Hamdan was
liable for the 3000 plus murders that occurred on 9/11. He may have
had the mental state of desiring the death of infidels but he did not do
enough, under any coherent conception of aiding and abetting, to
have become an accomplice in mass murder.80 The charge against
Hamdan was limited to the inchoate offense of joining an existing
conspiratorial agreement to attack civilian targets in the West-i.e.,
conspiracy in the first sense.
Clarifying these distinctions was a critical part of mounting
an argument against conspiratorial agreements as a crime against the
law of war. So far as the Court pondered conspiracy in Nuremberg
or conspiracy as a criterion of complicity, there was little hope of
characterizing conspiracies (in the sense of crimes of agreement) as
contrary to the law of war. The critical moment in the oral argument
came when Justice Stevens questioned attorney Neal Katyal about
the difference between the notion of agreement as a crime and com-
plicity. The exchange went like this:
JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask.., this question?
Supposing the charge had been slightly amended. In-
stead of saying, "The criminal purpose, and conspired
77. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946) (holding co-conspirator in
jail liable for offenses committed by other members of the conspiracy still at large).
78. Military Commission Instruction Number 2, supra note 6, at § 6(C)(6)(b)(5)
("Each conspirator is liable for all offenses committed pursuant to or in furtherance of the
conspiracy by any of the co-conspirators, after such conspirator has joined the conspiracy
and while the conspiracy continues and such conspirator remains a party to it.").
79. The arguments as recited here are based on my brief as amicus curiae for experts in
conspiracy and the law of war. See Brief of Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No.
05-184).
80. Under Model Penal Code § 2.06(3) (a)(ii) (2001), an accessory must either agree to
commit or aid the commission of an offense.
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and agreed with Osama bin Laden to commit the fol-
lowing offenses," it said, "It and Osama bin Laden at-
tempted to-aided and abetted in committing the fol-
lowing offenses." Would it then be-violate the laws
of war?
MR. KATYAL: Yes, with respect to this particular
claim about conspiracy, that would solve that prob-
lem. If you say the charge is attacking civilians, and
your theory of proving it is aiding and abetting the
murder or the attacking of civilians-
JUSTICE STEVENS: What if the trial judge who
looked at the indictment or ruling on a motion to dis-
miss the indictment, or its equivalent at this time-
said, "Well, I'm going to construe these words 'con-
spired or agreed' as the substantial equivalent of 'aid-
ing and abetting."' Would that let the charge stand?
MR. KATYAL: That would mix apples and oranges,
because "conspiracy" and "aiding and abetting" are
two entirely different things. One is a standalone of-
fense. And the [other] is a theory of how to prove a
violation-
JUSTICE STEVENS: But the language is "conspired
and agreed with." And "agreed with" is pretty close
to "tried to do it himself."
MR. KATYAL: It's not, Justice Stevens, because it
requires a different level of participation, and the li-
ability is entirely different. Because if conspiracy is
accepted, you're accepting Pinkerton liability. That's
what the Government's own charge said-the Gov-
ernment's own instruction said, which means that Mr.
Hamdan is liable for all the acts of 9/11 and every-
thing al Qaeda has done. "Aiding and abetting," as
you are saying, Justice Stevens, in your hypothetical,
is a much more closely tethered theory of liability, re-
quiring a higher level of individual culpability and a
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totally different level of punishment.8'
This exchange laid the conceptual groundwork for the Ste-
vens plurality. Justice Stevens grasped the critical distinction-
which I fear would be lost on many-between conspiracy as a stand-
alone offense of agreement and complicity for aiding and abetting the
commission of an offense.
We now are in a position to review the three major attacks on
charging conspiracy (as a standalone offense) under the law of war.
All three-the comparative, international, and historical critiques-
raise worthy methodological problems in their own right.
A. The Comparative Critique
Let us recall that whether conspiracy constitutes a chargeable
offense in a military tribunal depends on our construction of the law
of war. The first point to note is that the law of war is international
law and therefore it should be the same for the all the major legal sys-
tems of the world. This is the point on which Justice Thomas and his
two fellow dissenters82 broke company with the majority view on the
Court.83
The modem law of war is based largely on the written con-
ventions signed in The Hague and in Geneva. But the origins of the
idea in American law began in customary law, a body of norms that
purported to conform to the principles of warfare generally accepted
as binding international law. These customary, unwritten norms of
international law determine the outcome in the guiding precedents of
the Supreme Court, including the four principal cases Milligan,
Quirin, Yamashita, and Eisentrager. If these unwritten norms did not
apply in foreign as well as in American courts, we could not properly
refer to them as expressing a shared sense of being bound by the
same rules and principles.
The problem with conspiracy is that it is a distinctively com-
mon law idea. Beginning in the seventeenth century, the English
courts took the private law concept of "acting in concert" or "con-
81. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-25, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No.
05-184), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/
05-184.pdf.
82. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2328 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J. and
Alito, J.).
83. Justice Kennedy joined the plurality on the applicability of Common Article Three
of the Geneva Conventions under the law of war. Id. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part).
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spiracy" and began to punish specific agreements to commit unlawful
acts. The original context was conspiracy to engage in crimes against
administration of justice, as by procuring false and malicious indict-
ments. 84 By the early seventeenth century, the infamous Star Cham-
ber was punishing unexecuted conspiratorial agreements. 85 The es-
sence of the crime, as defined today in the federal statutes, is an
agreement to commit an unlawful act. 86 The idea that agreements
per se are punishable has never found acceptance in Continental
European law. Typical of European sentiment is Article 115 of the
1930 Italian Penal Code, which states: "Except where the law pro-
vides otherwise, whenever two or more persons agree for the purpose
of committing an offense, and it is not committed, none of them is
punishable for the sole fact of making the agreement. 87 With the
possible exception of the recently ratified Spanish Criminal Code,
88
there is no statutory basis in Continental Europe for stigmatizing
groups that do nothing more than agree to commit a crime. Conti-
nental European scholars agree on this point. 89 But we need to real-
ize the peculiarly American way of thinking about conspiracy. The
charge against Hamdan is not that Hamdan, bin Laden, and others en-
tered into an agreement to commit terrorist acts, but rather that Ham-
dan, as bin Laden's driver, "joined an existing conspiracy." It is not
clear how one joins a conspiracy but if you think of a criminal con-
spiracy as something like a criminal organization, then presumably
you can join by collaborating with the organization with the intent to
further its goals.
Formulated in this way, criminal conspiracy comes close to a
crime that is recognized in most European criminal codes, namely
membership in a criminal or terrorist organization.9" The old Soviet
Union had a crime of membership in anti-Soviet organizations-a
crime tainted by it applications against dissidents.91 Politics to one
84. An Ordinance Concerning Conspirators, 1305, 33 Edw. (Eng.). See also
Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 922-23 (1959).
85. Poulterer's Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (Star Chamber).
86. See 18 USC § 371 (2000).
87. Codice penale [C.P.] art. 115 (1930) (Italy), translated in GREAT BRITAIN FOREIGN
OFFICE, PENAL CODE OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, AS APPROVED BY ROYAL DECREE OCTOBER
19, 1930 (IN FORCE FROM JULY 1, 1931), at 33 (1931).
88. Codice penale [C.P.] art. 17 (1999) (Italy).
89. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 191 (2003); GERHARD WERLE,
VOLKERSTRAFRECHT 165 (2003) (no basis in international law for a charge of conspiracy to
commit a war crime or a crime against humanity), recently translated as GERHARD WERLE,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2005). I have long taken the same position. See GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKI NG CRIMINAL LAW 646-47 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (first published
in 1978).
90. StGB § 129 [German Criminal Code]; Code p~nal [C. PEN.] § 450-1 (France).
91. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RSFSR [Criminal Code] art. 72 (U.S.S.R.). For the political
uses of this offense, see TELFORD TAYLOR ET AL., COURTS OF TERROR: SOVIET CRIMINAL
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side, punishing membership per se raises conundrums. What consti-
tutes membership? Carrying a card? Swearing allegiance? Even if
we knew precisely what membership meant, American lawyers
would properly have qualms about punishing the passive status of
just being there and being counted.
This is something American lawyers in the 1950s and 1960s
may have learned from their searing experience with McCarthyism.
The Smith Act attempted to make it a crime merely to be a member
of the Communist Party.92 Yet the Supreme Court held firm against
this attempt to water down the principles of criminal liability. Even
though the justices upheld the Smith Act convictions in Scales,93 the
Court interpreted the Smith Act to require "not only knowing mem-
bership, but active and purposive membership, purposive that is as to
the organization's criminal ends." 94  Membership itself does not
threaten anyone. It cannot be a criminal wrong. The wrong to soci-
ety only occurs when someone, with his or her personal act, actually
promotes the criminal objectives of the organization.
Whether Hamdan would be guilty under this standard for
promoting the purposes of al Qaeda is open to dispute. The problem
basically is whether background providers-drivers, cooks, maids,
postmen, those who deliver groceries, etc.-are guilty of being part
of a conspiracy just because they know about the criminal ends.
95
There is a powerful precedent in the American courts for holding that
background providers are just passive components in the background,
not active agents promoting criminal ends.
96
To sum up, neither conspiracy nor membership in a terrorist
organization meets the standards of an international crime acceptable
to the leading legal systems of the world. Europeans reject conspir-
acy as it is understood by Americans, and Americans reject the crime
of membership in a terrorist organization, as is commonly recognized
in Europe. It follows that the charges of conspiratorial agreement
lodged against Hamdan cannot constitute part of the law of war.
JUSTICE AND JEWISH EMIGRATION (1976).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994) (criminalizing the act of advocating overthrow of
government).
93. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
94. Id. at 209.
95. I first discussed this theory in FLETCHER, supra note 89, at 219-25.
96. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940)
(seller of sugar to distillers not liable, despite his knowledge, for promoting the criminal end
of illegally manufacturing liquor.); United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.
1992) (lessor of apartment to persons making illegal drug not liable, despite his knowledge,
for complicity in manufacturing the drugs). But cf Direct Sales v. United States, 319 U.S.
703 (1943) (mail order seller of morphine liable where he had a "stake in the outcome" of
the illegal use by the buyers of his morphine).
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They do not meet the requirement, endorsed by the majority, that the
law of war accord with the principles applicable to all leading par-
ticipants in the international legal order.
As noted in the Stevens opinion, the argument that common
law thinkers exaggerate the relevance and legitimacy of conspiracy
was instantiated by the objection of the French judge in Nuremberg,
Professor Donnedieu de Vabres. He was not willing to accept con-
spiracy as a "standalone" crime and insisted on a formula that re-
duced conspiracy to a form of complicity. In his memorable phrase:
"The crime absorbs the conspiracy." 97 In other words, if you pro-
mote a criminal end, and the end succeeds, you are liable for perpe-
trating the end, but you are liable neither for attempt nor for complic-
ity per se, both of which are merged in the crime itself.
The Americans argued at Nuremberg that conspiracy as a
self-standing, non-mergeable crime should apply to all the major
charges-aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
In the end, however, they lost. The charge of conspiracy was applied
exclusively to the crime of collectively "planning, preparing, initiat-
ing, and waging of aggressive war." 98 In this context the charge of
conspiracy is redundant. The acts of "planning, preparing, initiating,
and waging" are by their nature collective actions. Nuremberg illus-
trates the second sense of conspiracy I outline above, namely the col-
lective execution of a crime viewed ex post.99
The comparative critique had some impact on the Stevens
opinion, 100 primarily in the citation to Telford Taylor's explanation
why the plan for charging of conspiracy failed at Nuremberg: "The
Anglo-American concept of conspiracy was not part of European le-
gal systems and arguably not an element of the internationally recog-
nized laws of war."101  A plurality of the Court thus accepted the
comparative critique of conspiracy. Yet the more devastating argu-
ments were to come in the international and historical refutations of
the government's position.
97. BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT IN NUREMBERG 123 (1963).
98. Stanislaw Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal Organization, in THE NUREMBERG
TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 213, 233-35 (G. Ginsburgs & V. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990).
99. See George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War-The
Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1513-26 (2002).
100. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2784 (2006).
101. TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR
36 (1992). Taylor also notes that the American effort to use membership in a criminal
organization failed as a trial strategy. Id. at 584-585, 638.
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B. The International Critique
The Nuremberg charge of conspiracy to engage in aggressive
war was nearly the last gasp of the American doctrine of conspiracy
in international law. True, the 1948 Genocide Convention makes it a
crime to engage in a conspiracy to commit genocide. 10 2 This is pecu-
liar because Nuremberg had already rejected the application of con-
spiracy to crimes against humanity, and the concept of genocide
grows out of the general category of crimes against humanity. Ad-
mittedly, the Statutes of the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals unre-
flectingly adopt the same language in the context of genocide, 10 3 but
in my view these references to conspiracy are merely the afterglow of
a dying concept.
Since 1948 and the residue of the Genocide Convention in the
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, every relevant international treaty on
international humanitarian law or international criminal law had de-
liberately avoided the concept and language of conspiracy. The Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949 say nothing about conspiracy. The Con-
vention Against Torture says nothing about it. 10 4 The recent treaties
designed to combat terrorism say nothing about the kind of conspir-
acy alleged against the supposed terrorist Salim Ahmed Hamdan.
10 5
And most importantly, the Rome Statute establishing the Interna-
tional Criminal Court remains firmly silent on the issue. 10 6 The rea-
son for this categorical rejection of the mid-century flirtation with the
concept of conspiracy is, I believe, that we have become more
strongly committed to the principle of individual accountability. 1 7
The charges of conspiracy as well as the attempt to criminalize or-
ganizations 10 8 reflected a yearning to impose collective guilt on the
German leadership.
The only references to conspiracy in the treaties of the last
sixty years are found in provisions in highly specialized treaties per-
102. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 3(b),
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
103. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art.
4(3)(b), 32 I.L.M. 1192; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art.
2(3)(b), in S.C. Res. 955, annex, U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
104. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
105. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, Jan. 12, 1998,
2149 U.N.T.S. 284; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, A/RES/54/109.
106. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 6 (definition of genocide omits reference to
conspiracy).
107. See id. art. 25(1) (rejecting the criminal liability of corporations and other groups).
108. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1984).
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taining to organized crime. 10 9 But these treaties do not purport to
recognize an international crime of conspiracy. They explicitly defer
to local mores on the use of conspiracy charges. Some legal systems
recognize conspiracy and others do not. Americans do. Others do
not. When only some countries accept a particular doctrine, it cannot
become part of customary international law applicable to all nations
as part of the law of war.
The Supreme Court plurality (with nothing in Justice Ken-
nedy's concurring opinion to indicate the contrary) recognizes the in-
ternational trend. At one point Justice Stevens notes that the crime of
conspiracy does not appear in the Geneva or Hague Conventions.
110
He sums up in the following lines:
Finally, international sources confirm that the crime
charged here is not a recognized violation of the law
of war .... [N]one of the major treaties governing the
law of war identifies conspiracy as a violation thereof.
And the only "conspiracy" crimes that have been rec-
ognized by international war crimes tribunals (whose
jurisdiction often extends beyond war crimes proper to
crimes against humanity and crimes against the peace)
are conspiracy to commit genocide and common plan
to wage aggressive war, which is a crime against the
peace and requires for its commission actual participa-
tion in a "concrete plan to wage war."111
C. The Historical Critique
Even more telling than the silence of international treaties on
the issue of conspiracy is the jurisprudential silence of the Supreme
Court, which has repeatedly rejected the possibility of affirming con-
spiracy as a punishable offense before military tribunals. The long
109. E.g., Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances art. 3, Dec. 20, 1988, E/CONF 82/15 ("Each Party shall adopt such measures as
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law ... c) Subject to
its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system ... iv) Participation in,
association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating
and counseling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this
article.") (emphasis added); see also Convention on Psychotropic Substances art.
22(2)(a)(ii), Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175; Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime art. 6(1)(b)(ii), Nov. 2, 2000, A/55/383.
110. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2758 (2006).
111. Id. at 2784. I read the last line as a covert endorsement of my thesis that
conspiracy to commit aggressive war is redundant because, as Justice Stevens puts it, the
crime presupposes "a concrete plan."
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series of cases begins with the landmark decision in Milligan. The
government had charged Milligan with numerous counts of sedition,
including a vague reference to a "conspiracy against the United
States." There is no mention of the object of this alleged conspiracy,
but significantly, this charge is clearly distinguished from count five
of the indictment alleging "violation of the law of war," indicating
that conspiracy was distinct and different from violations of the law
of war. The charge of conspiracy carried no weight in the coura-
geous decision of the Court to reject the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal in all cases when the state or federal courts could hear the
prosecution. The distinction between conspiracy theories and the law
of war, recognized by the Supreme Court in Milligan, is confirmed in
the leading work of the nineteenth century by Colonel William Win-
throp, 112 an author considered the "Blackstone of Military Law."
' 113
For our purposes, the most significant case is Quirin 14, the
influential Court judgment upholding the use of commissions on a
charge of violating the laws of war. The eight German saboteurs
were charged with four counts:
1. Violation of the law of war.
2. Violation of Article 81 of the Articles of War, de-
fining the offense of relieving or attempting to relieve,
or corresponding with or giving intelligence to, the
enemy [18 USC § 904]
3. Violation of Article 82, defining the offense of spy-
ing. [18 USC § 906]
4. Conspiracy to commit the offenses alleged in
charges 1, 2 and 3.115
As in Milligan, the distinction between counts one and four,
the violation of the law of war and the charge of conspiracy, indicates
that Attorney General Biddle, later to become so skeptical about the
conspiracy charge in Nuremberg, 116 regarded the two worlds as di-
vided by a conceptual barrier-the law of war on one side, and con-
spiracy, on the other. Ironically, the conspiracy charge was in fact
the most coherent charge against the eight German defendants. Apart
from their shared plan of action, they had not committed an offense
112. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 839 (United States War
Department 1920) (grouping conspiracy with substantive crimes such as murder and theft,
all distinguishable from offenses against the law of war).
113. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19, n. 38 (1957)).
114. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
115. Id. at23.
116. On Biddle's sympathies with the position of the French judge Donnedieu de
Vabres, see SMITH, supra note 97, at 126.
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against the laws of the United States-except illegal entry into the
country. They had not done enough on American soil to be liable for
an attempt under either count two (§ 904 (assisting the enemy)) or
count three (§ 906 (spying)).
President Roosevelt had thought, it seems, that the infiltrators
would be liable under these two provisions of Title 10, counts two
and three of the indictment. In drafting the executive order establish-
ing the commission, 117 he thought it was sufficient that those who
landed illegally on American shores were "preparing" to commit
sabotage or espionage. The problem was that §§ 904 and 906 of Title
10 do not punish mere "preparation." They require actual "aid or at-
tempt to aid" the enemyF18 or, in the case of spying, "lurking" around
a sensitive military installation.119
The most coherent charge against the eight defendants, there-
fore, was the fourth count, conspiracy to violate counts one, two, and
three. Surprisingly, however, Chief Justice Stone's opinion for the
Court does not even mention the possibility of convicting the eight
for conspiracy. Instead-five months after six of the eight convicted
defendants had been executed!-the Chief Justice developed the
novel theory that they were punishable as "unlawful combatants."
The theory of unlawful combatancy was based on the failure of
the eight defendants to have satisfied the four criteria of the Hague
Convention of 1907 for becoming belligerents and, if captured, pris-
oners of war. The four conditions were: "(1) To be commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates; (2) To have a fixed distinc-
tive emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) To carry arms openly;
and (4) To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war." 120 The eight infiltrators buried their uniforms upon
landing and proceeded beyond enemy lines without wearing a "fixed
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance." Thus they could not
qualify as belligerents and prisoners or war.
The holding in Quirin has long since ceased to be binding un-
der the law of war. First, the Third Geneva Convention Article 4 has
superseded the definition of combatancy in the Hague Conventions.
Now all captured members of the regular armed services should be
treated as prisoners of war. Second, more dramatically, Congress has
implicitly repudiated the theory of liability that Chief Justice Stone
117. Military Order No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942).
118. 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2006).
119. 10 U.S.C. § 906 (2006).
120. Annex to the Hague Convention IV Respecting the Law and Customs of War on
Land art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat, 2277, T.S. No. 539.
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developed in his Quirin opinion. 12 1 Under the new statute on mili-
tary commissions, an "unlawful enemy combatant" 122 is subject to
prosecution only for actually causing harm to some person or prop-
erty.123 The two relevant offenses-murder and destruction of prop-
erty-require more than walking around behind enemy lines without
wearing a uniform.
The intriguing historical question is why the Quirin Court
chose to focus on the dubious theory of unlawful combatancy. The
more plausible charge was conspiracy, but the Court refused to touch
it. Toward the end of his opinion, Chief Justice Stone summed up
the status of the four charges levied against the four defendants then
tried and convicted by the military tribunal:
Since the first specification of Charge I sets forth a
violation of the law of war, we have no occasion to
pass on the adequacy of the second specification of
Charge I, or to construe the 81st [18 USC §§ 904] and
82nd Articles of War [18 USC §§ 906] for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the specifications under
Charges II and III allege violations of those Articles or
whether if so construed they are constitutional. 124
The striking omission from this paragraph is the failure even
to mention Charge IV, namely "conspiracy to commit the offenses
alleged in charges 1, 2 and 3." The Court must have realized that the
conspiracy charge was not credible under the law of war.
In all the law-of-war commission cases since 1942, the Court
has adhered to the choice implicit in Quirin, namely that conspiracy
is not a basis for prosecuting violations of the law of war. In the
prosecution of General Yamashita and his subordinates, the Court
could have relied on a theory of conspiracy but instead it developed
the novel doctrine of command responsibility based on the negligent
failure of the General to supervise his troops in the field. 125
More recently, in a case testing the reach of the "law of na-
tions" in a different legal context, the Supreme Court similarly ig-
nored an obvious conspiracy in contemplating the proper legal char-
acterization of the facts. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,126 agents of the
121. See MCA 2006, supra note 5, § 948a(l)(A).
122. For the definition, see id. § 948b(a).
123. Id. § 950v(b)(13) (Intentionally causing serious bodily injury), § 950v(b)(16)
(destruction of property in violation of the law of war).
124. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46 (1942).
125. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). This doctrine has since been accepted in the
law of war. See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 28.
126. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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United States Drug Enforcement Agency conspired with a group of
Mexican nationals to abduct Alvarez-Marchain from his home in
Mexico and bring him to the United States to stand trial. Alvarez-
Machain subsequently sued Sosa, one of the DEA agents, as well his
co-conspirators under the Alien Tort Statute for the torts of abduction
and false imprisonment "in violation of the law of nations."
1 27
Though the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Alien Tort Stat-
ute in the abstract, it also rejected Alvarez-Machain's claim as too
speculative for recovery. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, char-
acterized the incident as "arbitrary detention" and found that tempo-
rary arbitrary detention was insufficient to constitute a violation of
the law of nations. Significantly, however, the detention and kidnap-
ping were in fact executed by a conspiracy constructed for that pur-
pose. The Court did not acknowledge the conspiracy as relevant to
the claim under international law. Sosa is but another in a long line
of cases in which the factor of conspiracy falls below the threshold of
the Court's legal sensibility.
This argument-based essentially on the silence of the Court
in the face of conspiracies present in the facts of the Court's prior
cases-found surprising resonance in the thinking of the Stevens plu-
rality in Hamdan. His bottom line: "If anything, Quirin supports
Hamdan's argument that conspiracy is not a violation of the law of
war." 128 It is worth pondering some of the plurality's reasoning why
the silence of the opinion speaks so clearly to the impermissibility of
conspiracy charges:
That the defendants in Quirin were charged with con-
spiracy is not persuasive, since the Court declined to
address whether the offense actually qualified as a
violation of the law of war-let alone one triable by
military commission. The Quirin defendants were
charged with the following offenses [there follows the
list given above].
The Government, defending its charge, argued that the
conspiracy alleged "constituted an additional violation
of the law of war." . . The saboteurs disagreed; they
maintained that "the charge of conspiracy can not
stand if the other charges fall .... The Court, how-
ever, declined to resolve the dispute. It concluded,
first, that the specification supporting Charge I ade-
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
128. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2782 (2006).
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quately alleged a "violation of the law of war... ,"129
In fact, as already argued, the first count was the least persua-
sive basis for a conviction. It was tantamount to a licensing viola-
tion: the combatants did not qualify as lawful combatants meriting
POW status under the Hague Convention. They were fighting with-
out the imprimatur that the DoD has called the "belligerent privi-
lege."' 130 The mere fact of their surreptitiously entering the country
hardly threatened a significant interest of the country or of the mili-
tary. It was largely of symbolic significance-an act connoting the
porousness of the American system of shoreline defense. Contrary to
Justice Stevens's affirmation of the reasoning in Quirin, the opposite
seems more plausible. The strongest basis for conviction would have
been conspiracy, and had they been charged in federal court, they
would presumably have been guilty of a conspiracy to commit sabo-
tage or to engage in other unlawful activities. 31 That the first count
was in fact the weakest underscores the negative implications of the
Quirin Court's silence about the conspiracy charge.
In his Hamdan opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized a pecu-
liar facet of the crime of unlawfully entering the United States,
namely that it was a completed crime:
[The Quirin Court's] analysis of Charge I placed spe-
cial emphasis on the completion of an offense; it took
seriously the saboteurs' argument that there can be no
violation of a law of war-at least not one triable by
military commission-without the actual commission
of or attempt to commit a "hostile and warlike act."
132
This argument seeks to convert the inchoate act of entering
the country with a hostile purpose-an act falling below the threshold
of criminal attempt-into a consummated offense, "a hostile and
warlike act." Let us suppose that merely entering the country-
breaching the country's territorial defenses-is indeed hostile and
warlike. It remains an inchoate offense punishable only because it
carries with it the potential of serious harm in the future. It is com-
plete only in the sense that all regulatory offenses-practicing medi-
cine or driving without a license-are complete upon engaging in the
action without the proper license or privilege.
Yet there may be a subtle point in the Court's reading the of-
129. Id. at 2781-82.
130. U.S. DEP'T. OF DEF., DOD MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 2, (5)(A) (Apr.
30, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/d20030430milcom
instno2.pdf.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000), §§ 2151-56 (2006).
132. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
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fense in Quirin as complete on its face. As we have seen since then
in the evolution of the law of war and war crimes, these are consum-
mated offenses claiming victims. The preamble to the Rome Statute
emphasizes the atrocities that occurred in the course of the twentieth
century. 133 The law of war emphasizes completed crimes-the law
responds to the plight of victims. 134 The implication is that purely
inchoate offenses, such as conspiracy, should not be punished under
the law of war.
Ultimately, the law of war has rejected conspiracy and other
purely inchoate offenses because the international community has no
effective mechanism of early intervention. If there were some means
to catch genocidal conspiracies at their inception it would be a good
idea to do so. But that mechanism does not exist and the jealous de-
fense of state sovereignty would very likely hinder the development
of an international police force with the capacity for intervention be-
fore the occurrence of harm. The law of war, therefore, continues to
address offenses retrospectively.
IV THE RISE AND FALL OF FOUR PRECEDENTS.
The entire law of military commissions revolves around four
specific cases that were decided between 1866 and 1950-Milligan,
Quirin, Yamashita, and Eisentrager. Each of the later cases refers to
and evaluates the earlier decisions. With the passage of the MCA
2006, the relative influence of these precedents has become of critical
moment. The future analysis of jurisdiction in military tribunals will
depend not only on Hamdan and MCA 2006, but on the precedents
that played a part in Hamdan. Their historical paths are worth re-
counting.
A. Milligan
The defendant, a civilian resident of Indiana, allegedly at-
tempted to liberate Confederate prisoners while the Civil War was
still raging. In April 1864 a military commission charged him with
"giving aid and comfort to the rebels" as well as a "violation of the
133. Rome Statute, supra note 18, pmbl., art. 2 ("Mindful that during this century
millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity .... ").
134. One exception to this pattern is Eisentrager, discussed infra at notes 151-54.
However, Eisentrager was implicitly rejected in Hamdan. See supra text accompanying
notes 146-47.
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laws of war." 135 He was sentenced to be hanged in May 1865, and
he may well have been hanged under presidential command before
the Court heard the case. 136 In a gesture of independence from the
executive, however, the Court addressed the legality of the military
tribunal and found, in a five to four majority, that the use of a mili-
tary commission in Indiana was an illegitimate attempt to impose
martial law in an area under civil jurisdiction. The essential holding
of the Court was that the law of war was inapplicable because "the
courts are open and their process unobstructed, 1
37
The underlying conflict elicited in the Milligan case is be-
tween the domain of the Constitution and the range of the law of war.
The test proposed by the Court-when the courts are functioning-
implies that if the normal civil functions of government remain op-
erative, the law of war has no application. The specific provision of
the Constitution that seemed to matter most to the Court was the right
to a jury trial. The justices had to explain why there was no jury trial
in military proceedings. This is actually a much more difficult ques-
tion than meets the eye.
Nothing in the Constitution exempts courts martial from the
constitutional requirement of a jury trial.138 The constitutional hinge
for differential treatment for courts martial is found in the Fifth
Amendment, which, after imposing the requirement of indictment by
grand jury, imposes an exemption "in cases arising in the land or na-
val forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger." The Milligan Court reasoned that if a grand jury was
not required in a court martial, then a trial jury should not either:
[T]he framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to
limit the right of trial by jury, in the sixth amendment,
to those persons who were subject to indictment or
presentment in the fifth. 
139
In addition the Milligan Court offers us a general theory why
court martial jurisdiction should be more expeditious, with fewer
guarantees than found in ordinary criminal trials:
[T]he discipline necessary to the efficiency of the
army and navy, required other and swifter modes of
135. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6 (1866).
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 121.
138. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see also id. amend. VI.
139. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 123. The jury requirement applies to the states under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). No case has yet held the grand jury to be a requirement of due process. The
argument quoted in the text is repeated in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942), but the
reference to the grand jury is dropped.
[45:427
MILITARY COMMISSIONS A CT OF 2006
trial than are furnished by the common law courts;
and, in pursuance of the power conferred by the Con-
stitution [in Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 (giving
Congress the power "to make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces")],
Congress has declared the kinds of trial, and the man-
ner in which they shall be conducted, for offences
committed while the party is in the military or naval
service. Every one connected with these branches of
the public service is amenable to the jurisdiction
which Congress has created for their government, and,
while thus serving, surrenders his right to be tried by
the civil courts.
This passage offers cogent arguments why the trial of our
troops must be expeditious and "swift" but there is no similar ur-
gency in the trial of enemy troops for violations of the laws of war.
American troops need discipline in order to be forged into an effec-
tive fighting force. Enemy detainees obviously do not require this
discipline. Also, as to our own troops, an argument of waiver ap-
plies, more or less-obviously with less force in armies staffed by
compulsory service. There is no similar argument applicable to de-
tainees held as prisoners of war or enemy combatants.
Milligan and its rhetoric have remained a powerful force in all
subsequent cases. On one point there was little dispute. Even if the
military authorities try to prevent access to the civil courts, they can-
not restrict the availability of habeas corpus as a means for testing the
legality of the suspect's confinement. As the Court concluded in
Quirin: The district court's action denying leave to file the petition
was in itself judicial action subject to appeal on a writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court. 140 Not until Eisentrager in 1950 did the Su-
preme Court call this principle into question.
The most difficult issues troubling the lawyers in Quirin was
what they should do about Milligan's dictate that if the courts are
open and functioning, they take priority over military authority. The
eight defendants were detained in Washington, D.C. The courts were
open and functioning-indeed, a few blocks away from their place of
detention. How could the Court possibly get around the powerful
Milligan precedent, holding that if a regular trial in state or federal
court remains feasible, the government cannot resort to a military tri-
bunal?
By the time Chief Justice Stone wrote his opinion in Quirin,
140. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24.
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the cases had been decided per curiam, the trials concluded, and six
of the defendants executed. Yet Milligan haunted his opinion. He
spoke of the case approvingly several times, but on the critical point
of claiming military jurisdiction when the civil courts are open and
functioning, he could not accept the implications of the 1866 prece-
dent. The only way to reconcile Milligan with a conviction in Quirin
was to limit the former to its facts:
[T]he Court concluded that Milligan, not being a part
of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy,
was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law of war
save as-in circumstances found not there to be pre-
sent, and not involved here-martial law might be
constitutionally established. 
14 1
This trimming of Milligan's influence is reinforced by the
opinion in Yamashita, where the issue was whether a Japanese gen-
eral could be properly charged in a military tribunal with the novel
war crime of failing adequately to supervise his troops, who commit-
ted widespread atrocities against civilians in the Philippines. The
Court said simply in reference to Milligan: "We are not here con-
cerned with the power of military commissions to try civilians."
' 142
In the final case of the four precedents, Eisentrager, in which
the Court departs from the Milligan principle of hearing claims
brought on writs of habeas corpus, the Court does not even mention
the 1866 precedent. 14 3 One might have thought that by the time of
the Korean War, the critical Civil War precedent was dead and for-
gotten.
In this vital and contested area, however, old cases never die.
Milligan reemerged, full-blown, in Justice Stevens's opinion in Ham-
dan. Unfortunately, for reasons I have pointed out above, 144 the in-
terpretation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is left out, but
Milligan is cited, nonetheless, for the principled limitations on the
use of martial law. The famous pronouncement on the scope of mili-
tary justice is quoted: "Martial rule can never exist where the courts
are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their juris-
diction."1 45 The interesting question is whether it is possible to take
141. Id. at45.
142. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946).
143. In Madsen v Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), in which the Court upheld the use of a
military tribunal against a civilian-a wife charged with killing her husband soldier on a
military base in Germany-the Court mentions in passing that Milligan properly explained
why there is no right to a jury trial in court martial cases. 343 U.S. at 360 n.26.
144. See supra text accompanying note 138.
145. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2776 n.25 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127).
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a position on the law of war without also expressing, implicitly, an
interpretation of the Constitution. The whole point of the law of war
in Milligan was to explain why the right to a jury trial did not apply
in military courts and martial or military tribunals. If Justice Stevens
endorses Milligan as good law and he relies upon the Milligan prin-
ciple limiting the role of martial law to situations in which the courts
are not functioning, he must be implicitly endorsing Milligan's prem-
ise that but for the law of war, the defendant would have a right to a
jury trial. Implicit in the adoption of Milligan, therefore, is the ac-
ceptance of the dynamic tension between the law of war and the con-
stitutional order. Milligan remains, therefore, a vital precedent.
B. Quirin
No case on the law of war has attracted more popular interest
than the colorful story of the eight German saboteurs who landed off
Long Island and Florida in June 1942.146 They buried their uniforms
and their explosives on the beach and then headed inland to reconnoi-
ter their potential targets. They did not get far before two of them got
cold feet and called the FBI to turn themselves in. All eight were ar-
rested within days, and Roosevelt immediately issued an executive
order establishing a military tribunal.
The subsequent proceedings have had an enormous impact on
the law related to military tribunals. The first critical step was that
the courts agreed to hear claims of habeas corpus while the proceed-
ings were pending. After the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion,
the tribunal quickly concluded its finding and issued its verdict. Six
of the defendants were hanged within days. Though it was objec-
tionable for Chief Justice Stone to take another four months to write
an opinion for the Court-imagine a version of Bush v. Gore1 47 in
which the Court says, "Bush wins, and later we will tell you why"-
the opinion expresses many important concerns about the law of war.
The four prominent issues in Quirin are: (1) Why are the eight de-
fendants not entitled to immunity as POWs? (2) What crime did they
commit by entering the United States surreptitiously? (3) Why are
they not entitled to a jury trial? and (4) Why are the procedural devia-
tions between military commissions and courts martial acceptable
under federal law?
146. See, e.g., STAN COHEN, DON DENEVI & RICHARD GAY, THEY CAME TO DESTROY
AMERICA (2003); MICHAEL DOBBS, SABOTEURS: THE NAZI RAID ON AMERICA (2004); Louis
FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed.
2005).
147. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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The answer to most of these questions revolves around the
use of two words the Court coined to describe the status of the eight
soldiers, namely, as "unlawful combatants." They failed to meet the
four conditions of the Hague Convention that would have made them
lawful or ordinary belligerents, entitled to be detained without trial
until the end of hostilities. 148 Because they wore civilian clothing
and failed to carry their arms openly, they were not entitled to POW
status and thus, in the Court's view, they could be found guilty of the
violation of the law of war that rendered them unlawful combatants.
Because they were guilty under the law of war, they were not subject
to the constitutional system of trial, with its jury trial and other pro-
cedural rights.
In Yamashita, Quirin proves to be the leading precedent in
favor of convicting the Japanese general of the war crimes of failing
adequately to supervise his troops. The only ominous sign in Yama-
shita is that Quirin is cited and quoted but totally cleansed of its con-
stitutional concerns about a right to a jury trial. The Constitution re-
cedes in the shadows as a question that might once have concerned
the Court but now-as to a tribunal sitting in the Philippines-
seemed to be less compelling. In dissent, Justice Murphy tried to
convince the Court that the proceedings should be governed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. His thesis reminds us
of the constitutional concerns exhibited by the Court in Milligan and
Quirin.
When Quirin meets Eisentrager, the contradiction becomes
too harsh to ignore. The tribunal in Eisentrager had convicted a
number of German civilians working in sympathy with the Japanese
in China in the period after the Germans had surrendered but the war
was still being waged against Japan. After their conviction in China,
they were sent to an American military base in Germany to serve
their sentence. 149 They tried to submit a writ of habeas corpus,
which was rejected on the ground that, under the circumstances, en-
emy aliens had no access to our courts. Since enemy aliens did in-
deed have access to our courts in Quirin, the Court had to confront an
uncomfortable inconsistency. The majority made a number of solid
148. Convention Between the United States of America and Certain Powers, with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex art. 1, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
1803, Treaty Series 403 (The Hague Convention):
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
149. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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points against the applicability of Quirin to a military tribunal sitting
abroad in war zone:
Those prisoners [in Quirin] were in custody in the
District of Columbia .... They were tried by a Mili-
tary Commission sitting in the District of Columbia at
a time when civil courts were open and functioning
normally. They were arrested by civil authorities and
the prosecution was personally directed by the Attor-
ney General, a civilian prosecutor, for acts committed
in the United States. . . . None of the places where
they were acting, arrested, tried or imprisoned were, it
was contended, in a zone of active military operations
or under martial law or any other military control, and
no circumstances justified transferring them from civil
to military jurisdiction. None of these grave grounds
for challenging military durisdiction can be urged in
the case now before us.
All of this is meant to justify not the use of commissions but
the banning of the prisoners' access to American courts under a writ
of habeas corpus. Thus the case law splits into two lines of develop-
ment, with one line following Eisentrager about the legitimacy of
testing confinement under habeas corpus, 15 1 and the second line,
leading to Hamdan, on the legitimacy and proper contours of military
tribunals.
Despite the attempt by Eisentrager to sidetrack Quirin, the
latter survived as one of the major props of Justice Stevens's opinion
in Hamdan. The indispensable contribution of Quirin is that it stands
squarely for the right of interlocutory appeal from military commis-
sion proceedings. In all the other cases from Milligan to Yamashita
to Eisentrager, the convicted defendants sought relief after verdict
and judgment. The remarkable feature of Quirin is that the Supreme
Court took the case in the middle of the commission proceedings.
This precedent was indispensable for the rejection of a strong gov-
ernment argument that the federal government should abstain until
the end of the military proceedings. In Hamdan, the issue of federal
abstention prior to final judgment occupied the judges at all three
levels 152 and was finally resolved, on the strength of Quirin, in favor
150. Id. at 779-80.
151. The most important cases under this line are Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004) and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
152. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2769 (2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415
F.3d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2004).
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of interlocutory appeal to test the jurisdiction of the tribunal.153
Quirin is, in fact, the star player in Hamdan's recasting of
prior history. Justice Stevens cites Chief Justice Stone's opinion
nearly thirty times, always approvingly, with one exception. The
plurality rejects the common view that 10 U.S.C. § 821 authorizes
military tribunals: "We have no occasion to revisit Quirin's contro-
versial characterization of Article of War 15 [now § 821 ] as congres-
sional authorization for military commissions."'15  Justice Stevens
seems to prefer the view that the commissions are authorized not by
analogy to courts martial but directly by the law of war. 1
55
Justice Stevens's most effective use of Quirin was his de-
scribing the case as the "high-water mark of military power."'
156 I
should have thought that Eisentrager was the high-water mark, but
that would be true only as to the military's ability to avoid defending
itself on a writ of habeas corpus. As to why Stevens characterized
Quirin as the top card in the government's hand, we should look at
his words:
Quirin is the model the Government invokes most fre-
quently to defend the commission convened to try
Hamdan. That is both appropriate and unsurprising.
Since Guantdtnamo Bay is neither enemy-occupied ter-
ritory nor under martial law, the law-of-war commis-
sion is the only model available. At the same time, no
more robust model of executive power exists; Quirin
represents the high-water mark of military power to
try enemy combatants for war crimes. 
1 57
In making this argument, Justice Stevens relies on the tripartite dis-
tinction he carved out at the beginning of his opinion-namely, be-
tween cases of martial law, occupied territory, and the law-of-war
tribunal. 158 Milligan was an example of the former, Kinsella of the
second category,' 9 and Quirin of the third. The only way to justify a
military tribunal in Guantdnamo, therefore, was to rely on Quirin.
But this is puzzling. Why did Justice Stevens not invoke Yamashita
or Eisentrager as the model of governmental power in military tribu-
nals? To answer that question, we proceed to analyze the preceden-
tial impact of those cases decided between Quirin and Hamdan.
153. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2771.
154. Id. at 2774.
155. On this thesis, see supra text at notes 53-54.
156. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
159. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
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C. Yamashita
Of the four cases decided between 1866 and 1950, Yamashita
was the only one to generate a new principle of substantive law,
namely the principle of command responsibility now recognized in
Article 28 of the Rome Statute. According to the facts alleged in the
military commission, General Yamashita failed adequately to super-
vise his troops in the Philippine provinces when they went on a ram-
page against civilians. Nonetheless the case has been much criticized
for its procedural irregularities1 60 and seems to have carried little
weight in subsequent decisions. On the issue of habeas corpus, Eis-
entrager circumvents Yamashita in much the way it disposed of
Quirin:
By reason of our sovereignty at that time over these
insular possessions [the Philippines], Yamashita stood
much as did Quirin before American courts. Yama-
shita's offenses were committed on our territory, he
was tried within the jurisdiction of our insular courts
and he was imprisoned within territory of the United
States. None of these heads of jurisdiction can be in-
voked by these prisoners. 
161
Thus both Quirin and Yamashita are interpreted to be cases
about domestic detainees. According to the Court, the writ of habeas
corpus should be available on behalf of those who had some contact
with the territorial United States (even if, as in Quirin, the contact
was unlawful). But as to those arrested, tried, and detained abroad,
the writ should not run. There is more on this point below.
In Hamdan, Justice Stevens goes out of his way to undercut
the current weight of Yamashita as a justification for the use of mili-
tary tribunals. The key issue in that case, as the plurality saw it, was
that it stood for the permissible deviation of military tribunal proce-
dures from court martial procedure. 162 Any deviation of this sort col-
lides with the uniformity requirements of § 836 of UCMJ, 163 that is,
the procedures of tribunals must be as uniform as practicable with
those used in courts martial. It will be recalled this was an objection
in Quirin as well but the Court did not take it seriously. In the Ham-
dan opinion of Justice Stevens, the violation of statutory principles of
uniformity became critical. He summed up his critique with a devas-
160. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 28 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 41
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
161. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 780 (1950).
162. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2788-90 (2006).
163. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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tating line banning Yamashita from further consideration: "The most
notorious exception to the principle of uniformity, then, has been
stripped of its precedential value."'
64
D. Eisentrager
As the leading and virtually only Supreme Court case denying
the writ of habeas corpus to detainees in American prison, Eisen-
trager had a brilliant but brief career after 9/11 in the lower federal
courts. 165 It was the leading authority for the president's position
that his office could decide, without judicial review, who should be
confined as an enemy combatant. Eisentrager's influence declined in
2004 when the Court held the constitutional writ of habeas corpus
available to citizens detained in Guantdtnamo Ba 166 and extended
the equivalent statutory right to foreign detainees. 1
67
In the deliberations of the Hamdan majority, Eisentrager ap-
pears to be a dead letter. Justice Stevens writes that "it does not con-
trol this case."'168 Its influence is relegated to the dissent, where it is
cited supportively several times by Justice Thomas.
169
In the end, then, the two cases that carry weight in Hamdan
are the two oldest precedents, Milligan and Quirin. Among the four,
these two stress the tension between the Constitution and the law of
war. This is very significant for the status of the Hamdan decision in
the face of the MCA 2006.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF CONSPIRACY
The new statute reenacts a crime of conspiracy without actu-
ally defining it:
Any person subject to this chapter who conspires to
commit one or more substantive offenses triable by
military commission under this chapter, and who
knowingly does any overt act to effect the object of
the conspiracy shall be punished, if death results to
one or more of the victims, by death or such other
punishment as a military commission under this chap-
164. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790.
165. E.g. Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
166. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
167. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
168. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794.
169. Id. at 2844-46.
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ter may direct .... 7 0
The provision of the MCI2 invalidated in Hamdan had de-
fined the offense as consisting of three elements:
1) The accused entered into an agreement with one or
more persons to commit one or more substantive of-
fenses triable by military commissions or otherwise
joined an enterprise of persons who shared a common
criminal purpose that involved, at least in part, the
commission or intended commission of one or more
offenses triable by military commission.
2) The accused knew the unlawful purpose of the
agreement or the common criminal purpose of the en-
terprise and joined it willfully, that is, with the intent
to further the unlawful purpose.
3) One of the more conspirators or enterprise mem-
bers, during the existence of the agreement or enter-
prise, knowingly committed an overt act in order to
accomplish some objective or purpose of the agree-
ment or enterprise.
The only significant substantive departure from the MCI2 in
the current statute is the requirement that each of the conspirators
commit an overt act. If Hamdan could be shown to have "conspired"
with al Qaeda to kill civilians, his driving for bin Laden would
probably be sufficient to qualify as an overt act. He would presuma-
bly be guilty of conspiracy and subject to the death penalty. Whether
this new form of conspiracy is properly subject to liability in a mili-
tary commission is now possibly a question of life or death.
How should we interpret this reenactment of conspiracy as a
crime? Does it represent contempt for the Supreme Court, or is the
narrowing of the offense sufficient to rescue it from the ambit of
Hamdan? Congress does not attempt to reenact the procedural defi-
ciency that the Court held in violation of Common Article Three.
Why should they treat conspiracy differently? Here are some possi-
ble replies:
1. This is a different offense, not equivalent to the
charges made in Hamdan.
2. The Stevens opinion represents a plurality-four
votes. It is not binding.
170. MCA 2006, supra note 5, § 950v(28).
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3. A judicial ruling about the law of war is subject to
change by Congress. This makes interpretations of
the law of war different from interpretations of Com-
mon Article Three or of the Constitution.
As for the first point, adding a stricter overt act requirement
does not change the essential nature of conspiracy as a stand-alone
inchoate offense. It still runs afoul of the law of war, which focuses
on ex post arrest and punishment-after harm has occurred. Yet, to
the credit of the MCA 2006, in contrast to the MCI2, the statute men-
tions conspiracy only once, thus avoiding the use of the concept both
as an offense and as as a criterion of complicity. Indeed, the way the
provision is formulated, the level of punishment depends on the con-
sequences, which makes the crime a hybrid between the stand-alone
offense and conspiracy as a mode of liability for homicide. In cases
where death has occurred, the government could argue effectively
that the notion of conspiracy used in the statute stakes out new
ground. It is no longer an inchoate agreement punishment at a stage
prior to occurrence of concrete harm to anyone. For purposes of ar-
gument, however, let us assume that the MCA 2006 definition of
conspiracy is sufficiently close to the prior definition of conspiracy to
fall within the ambit of Justice Stevens opinion in Hamdan.
There remains a problem that the Stevens opinion is a plural-
ity of four votes. Yet Justice Kennedy said nothing to disapprove of
plurality's interpretation of the law of war. And Justice Roberts,
though he voted against Hamdan in the Court of Appeals, might feel
bound by Justice Stevens's plurality opinion. On this issue we shall
simply have to wait and see.
As for the status of the law of war, there is good case for the
constitutionality of Justice Stevens's interpretation of tradition. As
pointed out in my review of the precedents, he relies directly and in-
tensively on Quirin and Milligan, both of which juxtapose the law or
war with the Sixth Amendment. In both, the law of war trumps the
right to a jury trial. Arguments about the law of war are constitu-
tional in the sense that they have an impact on the content of consti-
tutional rights. In my opinion, this is the way future courts should
read Hamdan and if they do, they will strike down the re-enactment
of the conspiracy provision in MCA 2006. Reaching beyond the
scope of the law of war, the statute defines crimes that can be prose-
cuted only in civil courts, not in military commissions. Thus, it is
unconstitutional.
It is doubtful, however, that the government will allege a con-
spiracy to kill civilians against the background providers who play
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minimal roles similar to those of drivers, cooks, maids, and those
who deliver bread in the morning. It would make more sense to in-
voke a new charge in the panoply commission offenses, adapted from
federal law, 171 a conspiracy to "provide material support or resources
to an international terrorist organization." 172 According to the defini-
tions provided in the federal statute, providing transportation or other
services is sufficient to trigger liability. 1
73
The challenge for the future will be to analyze whether this
and other newly conceived offenses fall within the law of war. The
government has vast prosecutorial powers under the new statute, and
if they choose to use it, we can expect serious litigation challenging
the statute on the basis of Hamdan and the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence from Milligan to Quirin.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
172. MCA 2006, supra note 5, §§ 950v(b)(25), (28).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2006).
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